The Constitutional Right to Information in Poland. Theory and Practice by Bernaczyk, Michal
International Comparative Jurisprudence 2019 Volume 5 Issue 1 
ISSN 2351-6674 (online) DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.13165/j.icj.2019.05.005  
 
36 
 
 
 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION IN POLAND. THEORY AND PRACTICE 
 
Michal Bernaczyk1 
 
University of Wrocław, Poland 
E-mail: michal.bernaczyk@uwr.edu.pl  
 
Received 8 April 2019; accepted 21 May 2019 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.13165/j.icj.2019.05.005   
 
Abstract. The following article provides the outline of the right to information on activities of the persons discharging public functions 
and public organs in the Republic of Poland. The article considers the structure of the right established in the Constitution of 2 April 1997 
and its connection with freedom to receive and impart information. 
 
Keywords: access to information, freedom of information, freedom of expression, constitution, constitutional interpretation, access to 
documents, exemptions 
 
Introduction  
 
The article aims to describe a constitutional right to information from the theoretical and structural perspective 
and its unclear, evolving features in the Polish constitutional court’s jurisprudence. The Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal perspective might be seen as an icon of changing perception of transparency at the dawn of the 21st 
century: from enthusiastic broad interpretation of constitutional provisions to rather lukewarm and strict reading 
of the Art. 61 of The Constitution of 2 April 1997 favouring limited scope of access and discretionary execution 
of power by the executive. The article emphasizes importance of the system of government whose task is to 
support the individual rights, most notably independent and impartial constitutional and supreme courts or 
tribunals. This task may also be difficult to achieve if there is no long standing and transparent doctrine applied 
to constitutional interpretation. Therefore, the impact of a doctrine (and its application by the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal) on a citizen's right to information shall be examined. 
1. The idea, the constitutional implementation and the practice 
The proliferation of freedom of information laws in the late 1990s was result of two main claims supported by a 
major shift in global and European politics. Firstly, the collapse of the Iron Curtain, a triumphal march of 
parliamentary democracy in Middle and Eastern Europe contributed to the vision of democracy as most effective 
system. Since the contemporary understanding of democracy implies representative system mandated by the 
people and implemented for the people, transparency and accountability quickly became catch phrases 
associated with freedom of information laws. Secondly, the Western democracies (but also such Asian 
hegemons as India or Japan) decided to debunk the accusation of political establishment's alienation and create 
more opportunities for well-informed citizen to get involved in public affairs on both national or local level of 
government. The concept of universal access to information (freedom of information or access to information) is 
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understood to mean entitlement having the following structure: 1) it is the right to be exercised by an individual, 
a legal person or another organizational unit without the need to show any legal interest in that information; 2) 
the right is addressed to the widely understood public authorities; it is the obligation of the public authorities or 
other entities acting on behalf of the state, and in special circumstances also of private entities, to provide 
information within specified time limits, in the manner and form prescribed by the law; 3) withholding of 
information is possible only in cases specified by the law, where it is highly probable that its disclosure would 
harm other persons (e.g. with regard to their privacy, health, life), state security, international relations, effective 
detection and combating crime, confidential information of entrepreneurs; invoking the exemption of certain 
values and interests cannot have a purely nominal nature; 4) the right guarantees an appeal procedure in the form 
of re-examination of the case by the body having control of the information or – in the form of devolution – an 
appeal to a higher instance; the law provides also for the possibility to make further appeals to an independent 
and impartial court. 
In 2014 the number of Freedom of Information Laws in Europe reached 36, while the 2012 estimation of the 
overall number of FOIA laws in the world reached 93 (Vleugels, 2012). Estimation is the proper word because 
the result may vary depending on what counts as a legal, normativist source of right of access to the 
government's information. The origin of right to information may be traced either to proactive interpretation of 
freedom of speech clauses or explicit statement delivered by constitution makers (which makes the Polish 
Constitution the prime example of such approach). Sometimes it may be the product of both factors: an open 
ended issue of constitutional guarantees to acquire information and sub-constitutional, statutory expansion in a 
form of subjective right of access to the government's records. 
The spectrum of constitutional provisions starts from such exclusive examples like Sweden, where the Freedom 
of the Press Act from 1766 granted access to official documents and became an integral part of the constitutional 
system. A moderate and relatively widespread approach includes a separate provision on access to official 
documents accompanied by earlier and traditional clause on freedom of expression (Art. 25 Sec. 5 of the 
Lithuanian Constitution, Art. 17 Sec. 5 of the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Basic Freedoms, Art. 26 
Sec. 5 of the Constitution of Slovakia) or relocate access to documents to a separate provision (Art. 44 of the 
Estonian Constitution, Art. 61 of the Constitution of Poland). A formal separation between the freedom of 
speech and the right to information is spelled out in Art. 30 (“Freedom of Expression”) and Art. 31 (“The Right 
to Information”) of the Constitution of Romania of 21 November 1991. Pursuant to Art. 31(1) of the Romanian 
Constitution, “A person's right of access to any information of public interest cannot be restricted”. It is worth 
noting the imposition of a duty to provide accurate information on the part of the public authorizes (Art. 31(2) of 
the Romanian Constitution), which is binding as well as on “ public and private media” who are likewise 
required to “provide correct information to the public opinion” (Art. 31(4) of the Romanian Constitution). The 
solution adopted, for example in Art. 44 of the Constitution of Estonia of 28 June 1992 pertains to certain types 
of information (“Everyone shall have the right to freely receive information circulated for general use”) which 
constitutes a living example of the up-to-date nature of theories and views concerning information assets. 
Specific references to such “information” and to its specific functions as well as content are included only in its 
subsequent provisions. Pursuant to Art. 44 (2) of the Constitution of Estonia: “At the request of Estonian 
citizens, and to the extent and in accordance with procedures determined by law, all state and local government 
authorities and their officials shall be obligated to provide information on their work, with the exception of 
information which is forbidden by law to be divulged, and information which is intended for internal use only”. 
The statute implementing the constitutional right to public information was adopted by the Riigikogu on 15 
November 2002 (Riigi Teataja - Official Journal of the State 2000/92/597). Moreover, Art. 44 (3) of the 
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Estonian Constitution states that “Estonian citizens shall have the right to become acquainted with information 
about themselves held by state and local government authorities and in state and local government archives, in 
accordance with procedures determined by law. This right may be restricted by law in order to protect the rights 
and liberties of other persons, and the secrecy of children's ancestry, as well as to prevent a crime, or in the 
interests of apprehending a criminal or to clarify the truth for a court case. 
Such solutions are common in the third wave's democratic constitution however it must be noted that they did 
not appear in its first phase but rather in the last decade of the 20th century. Specific provisions regarding access 
to information were not included in the democratic constitutions established as a definitive closure of 
authoritarian period by the Carnation Revolution in Portugal (1976) or the fall of the Regime of Colonels in 
Greece (1975). Neither the Spanish Constitution (1978), through which the democratic transformation 
continued, nor Latin American democratization processes recognized the need for explicit provisions in this 
matter. Apart from freedom of expression (protected by Art. 20), Art. 105 Sec. b of the Constitution of Spain 
requires the law to establish the access of citizens to “administrative” files and records, except to the extent that 
they may concern the security and defence of the State, the investigation of crimes and the privacy of persons. 
The Spanish example is particularly interesting because the constitutional jurisprudence - based on a 
constitution's structure - rejected the connection between fundamental freedom of information with the right of 
access to an administrative document, claiming that the latter was not included into the fundamentals right 
catalogue (Art. 14-29) and therefore does not benefit from the reinforced protection of fundamental rights 
(Puigpelat, 2017). We are about to see that similar structural interpretation is being suggested by some Polish 
scholars who seem to prioritize gravity of constitutional rights in Poland depending on their nominal 
classification (e.g. fundamental or political, positive or negative, rights or freedoms). 
At the opposite spectrum there are countries which do not have such explicitly established right in their 
constitutions however a right to information appears as a product of creative extra-textual interpretation which 
treats constitution “as more than the sum of its written provision: as a normative structure whose provisions are, 
either explicitly or implicitly, based on deeper principles, and ultimately on abstract norms of political morality 
that are deepest source of its authority” (Goldsworthy, 2017). Such approach might be seen in multiple 
jurisdictions where a right of access to information was recognized due to progressive interpretation of freedom 
of speech protection clauses with little literal substance pointing to governmentally held data, records, 
documents etc. Japanese, Indian and Israeli examples will support such observation. 
The Japanese Supreme Court’s jurisprudence recognized famous “right to know” or “right to be informed” 
(shiru kenri) in opinion of 26 November 1969 (also known as Hakata Train Station film case) due to progressive 
interpretation of the Art. 21 of the Japanese Shōwa Constitution of 1946 (Bernaczyk, Muszalska, 2014). Similar 
arguments may be found in India's Supreme Court's opinion of 30 December 1982 in S. P. Gupta v. President Of 
India And Others (AIR 1982 SC 149) where court upheld its previous conclusions on the freedom of speech (see 
Art. 19 Sec. 1(a) of the Constitution of India) as a source of right to know and the intrinsic relation between the 
sovereign and public officials based on transparency rather than secrecy. In the reasons for judgment in earlier 
India's Supreme Court opinion of 24 January 1975, State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain and others the court 
explained that “a government of responsibility like ours, where all the agents of the public must be responsible 
for their conduct, there can be but few secrets. The people of this country have a right to know every public act, 
everything, that is done in a public way, by their public functionaries. They are entitled to know the particulars 
of every public transaction in all its bearing. The right to know, which is derived from the concept of freedom of 
speech, though not absolute, is a factor which should make one wary, when secrecy is claimed for transactions 
Michal BERNACZYK  
International Comparative Jurisprudence. 2019, 5(1):36-46. 
 
 
39 
 
which can, at any rate have no repercussion on public security. To cover with veil of secrecy the common 
routine business, is not in the interest of the public. Such secrecy can seldom be legitimately desired” (AIR 1975 
SC 865). 
The Israeli Supreme Court's opinion of 8 May 1990 in Meshulam Shalit v. Shimon Peres followed the same 
pattern with striking similarity and an interesting focus on the nature of the bond between the elected and the 
electors in a parliamentary system: “The democratic process can only function on condition that it is possible to 
clarify openly all problems on the agenda of the State and exchange opinions about them freely. The continuity 
of the relationship between the elected and the elector loses, it is true, some of its direct nature and intensivity 
after the elections, but election does not sever the bond between the public and its elected representatives until 
the next elections. (...). Freedom of public opinion and knowledge of what is happening in the channels of 
government are an integral part of a democratic regime, which is structured on the constant sharing of 
information about what is happening in public life with the public itself. Withholding of information is justifiable 
only in exceptional cases where security of the State or foreign relations may be impaired or when there is a risk 
of harming some vital public interest” (HCJ 1601/90). 
Taking into considerations these two far ends of a spectrum, the Constitution of The Republic of Poland adopted 
on 2 April 1997 falls into former category with unprecedented level of detail in description of right to 
information on activities of state institutions and its various agents. If a gravity of constitutional right were 
measured by the text volume, a quick comparison to other articles of Chapter II (The Freedoms, Rights and 
Obligations of Person and Citizens) would surely establish right to information among most important ones. 
According to Art. 61 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland: 
“A citizen shall have the right to obtain information on the activities of organs of public authority as well as 
persons discharging public functions. Such right shall also include receipt of information on the activities of 
self-governing economic or professional organs and other persons or organizational units relating to the field in 
which they perform the duties of public authorities and manage communal assets or property of the State 
Treasury” (section 1). 
The right to obtain information shall ensure access to documents and entry to sittings of collective organs of 
public authority formed by universal elections, with the opportunity to make sound and visual recordings” 
(section 2). 
Limitations upon the rights referred to in paras. 1 and 2 above, may be imposed by statute solely to protect 
freedoms and rights of other persons and economic subjects, public order, security or important economic 
interests of the State (section 3). 
The procedure for the provision of information, referred to in paras. 1 and 2 above shall be specified by statute, 
and regarding the Sejm and the Senate by their rules of procedure (section 4). 
In terms of timing Polish constitutional (1997) and statutory (Act of 6 September 2001 on access to public 
information) solutions in the area of right to information were in line with the democratization trend of the late 
20th century. However, social pressure to break a veil of secrecy might be traced back to the origin of 
Independent Self-Governing Labour Union Solidarity founded in 1980 in an undemocratic, communist People's 
Republic of Poland. In its social policy manifesto prepared for the First National Assembly of Solidarity 
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Delegates held in Gdańsk on 5–10 September, 26 September and 7 October 1981, Solidarity proposed a 
revolutionary Thesis no. 23(6): 
“A legal system shall guarantee fundamental civic freedoms, respect equality under the law of all citizens and 
institution of public life. It is necessary to (...) establish full transparency of public life which, among other 
factors, is dependent on citizens’ access to documents held by administrative authorities. Limitations on the 
transparency of public life and access to documents shall be imposed by statute”. 
A brutal suppression of Solidarity by the sudden introduction of the martial law on 13 December 1981, followed 
by progressing decline of the communist political system and its economy, eventually led to so called Round 
Table Talks and peaceful transition of power with culmination in the first partially free elections on 4 June 1989. 
The constitutional reforms that took place throughout the 1990s, between December 1989 and the adoption of 
comprehensive, codified constitution on 2 April 1997 not necessarily explored the issue of transparency. 
Adoption of multiple provisions concerning individual’s informational self-development (Art. 51 - right to 
personal data protection, including a right of access to official documents and data collections concerning a data 
subject, Art. 54 - freedom of information gathering and dissemination, Art. 61 - right to obtain information on 
the activities of state and its officials, Art. 74 - right to be informed of the quality of the environment and its 
protection) and their entry into force on 17 October 1997 did not result in clear and coherent vision of 
fundamental rights. The transformation of Central and Eastern European countries allows for the hypothesis that 
the right to information was understood there as an attractive element which occurred in Western countries with 
stable democratic systems, and as such - was suitable to follow and for adoption in countries so far deprived of 
the culture of the democratic rule of law and respect for human rights. As in case of many legal transplants or 
‘borrowings’ (Perju, 2012), this operation might not have been sufficiently thought-out, both axiologically (lack 
of reference of the right to public information to a specific concept of rights of the individual), and systemically 
(the problem with combining the mechanisms for disclosure of information with the principle of liability of the 
state and its officers for improper exercise of public authority and management of public property). Of course a 
legal transplant does not carry a pejorative meaning by itself. It is a practice, a lack of effective enforcement that 
undermines any law and not merely borrowings. This however made freedom of information/access to 
information laws of Middle and Eastern Europe extremely vulnerable to a rejection and decline along with other 
populist symptoms of discontent (Krastev, Holmes, 2018) toward not so distant adoption of the rule of law, 
accountability and truth as foundations of public life.  
Poland constitutes a very interesting example because a relatively weak standard of statutory provision, a lack of 
any institutional support and promotion among citizens (e.g. in a form of independent information commissioner 
or ombudsman) superseded the concept of transparent government before the actual rise of populism in the 
October 2015 parliamentary elections and the constitutional crisis that followed. Neither the normative 
conditions pre-existing constitutional crisis, nor their interpretation, worked in favour of governmental 
transparency. The current government’s practice does not require introduction of any radical changes to shield 
itself from public scrutiny. Unlike their ideological predecessor in Hungary (Marietta Le, 2013), Polish 
executive branch just had to creatively deploy an existing case-law arising from an extremely (by Polish 
standards) vague statutory provision to successfully slow down or exempt the independent press from access to 
information, creating a political narrative in which government just follows a long-standing routine sanctioned 
by administrative judiciary. The judicial practice did not exhaust the constitutional potential vested in Art. 54, 61 
or self-executable status of Art. 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (see Art. 91 Sec. 1 and 2 of the 
Polish Constitution).  
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Instead of choosing the logical approach in which exclusive content of the right of information stems directly 
from Art. 61 of the Polish Constitution, the administrative courts gradually adversed the Kelsenian pyramid by 
reading the Constitution through the eyes of the legislative assuming unquestioningly that statutory language of 
2001 develops or merely imitates the language of the basic law. Consequently, despite the crystal clear 
constitutional provision, the Polish state seemed to fail on ethical grounds (successfully avoiding the key 
question in social debate of why and for what purpose such right was established) and in practice (increasing 
judicial activism of administrative courts which have failed to recognize several inconsistencies between 
statutory and constitutional provisions). By 2010 a judicial activism of the Supreme Administrative Court started 
to grow, limiting a scope of the law on access to information. The process intertwined with a passivist stance of 
the parliament. The latter showed – a typical reluctance of parliamentary system of government (see Irish 
example by A. Roberts, 2006) – to improve a statutory provisions imposing more open information policy on 
executive branch whenever the government operates solely on confidence of the parliament’s majority. The 
Polish Law on Access to Public Information of 6 September 2001 remains an inglorious example how a FOI law 
may fail to reach its objectives once established in parliamentary system of government. A natural relation 
between parliamentary majority and the executive branch creates little incentive to overcome gaps and limitation 
on access to public records resulting from judicial interpretation. Polish administrative courts successfully 
shielded executive branch from public scrutiny e.g. developing a case law on “intra-agency records” (or “internal 
documents”) which - by Supreme Administrative Court conclusion - are absolutely excluded from the scope of 
the 2001 FOI law, although legislative history does not prove such provisions were even considered by the 
members of parliament (Bernaczyk, 2017). Such phenomena took place entirely within judicial branch, without 
any dedicated amendment from legislative branch. It sharply contrasted with the adverse opinion on separation 
of powers and judicial role in statutory interpretation of internal records exemption presented in similar period 
by U.S. Supreme Court in its 8-1 decision of 7 March 2011 in Glen Milner v. Department of Navy: “If these or 
other exemptions do not cover records whose release would threaten the Nation’s vital interests, the 
Government may of course seek relief from Congress” (562 U. S. (2011)). 
As a result Polish legislative or executive branch never had to propose and introduce any limitations on access 
since it gained an ally in judicial interpretation although the price to pay was extremely high if measured by rule 
of law and separation of powers standards: the administrative courts started to implement strong deference to the 
executive branch applying extra-textual and constitutionally dubious methods of interpretation. 
Last but not least, a lack of support from the constitutional scholars and by and large sceptical approach to a 
concept of open government, transparency created the perfect storm. A narrow reading of the right to 
information clause was justified by structural argument so it is worth exploring how this argumentation began to 
unravel. 
2. The right to information and the structure of constitutional rights 
From the beginning it was suggested that internal structure of the Chapter II divided into unmarked subchapters 
established the relation between individual provisions, most notably by granting an implied ontological 
superiority to freedoms (wolności) while rights (prawa) have been regarded as merely rights to positive state 
actions with much more wider margin of leeway for a legislative drafting the substance of each right. Art. 61 
soon became an object of both isolated and oversimplified (from structural standpoint) interpretation. A doctrine 
quickly recognized the Art. 61 as constitutional “right to something” known in the analytical categorization of 
rights (Alexy, 2010). Such doctrinal entry point seemed to work in favour of access to information. One could 
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praise the law-makers of the Polish constitution who (in theory) successfully avoided a dilemma whether 
freedom of expression and information gathering could cover ‘a right to positive acts’ (e.g. access to 
documents). It took almost two decades to solve similar problem under Art. 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights assuming we position the opening of practical and doctrinal debate with rather sceptical 
conclusion in 1998 case of Guerra and Others v. Italy “that freedom [to receive information – M.B.] cannot be 
construed as imposing on a state, in circumstances such as those of the present case, positive obligations to 
collect and disseminate information of its own motion” (case no. 116/1996/735/932, § 53). Despite the initial 
restrained approach, a lengthy process of recognizing positive obligation was concluded in judgments of 10 July 
2006 in Sdružení Jihočeské Matky v. the Czech Republic (application no. 19101/03) and of 14 April 2009 
Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary (application no. 37374/05). Unfortunately the doctrinal interpretation 
of the Polish Constitution did not perceive freedom of information as a subjective right with a complex structure 
(R. Alexy, 2010, p. 128), quickly departing intricacy of material connections between articles 54 and 51, 61 or 
74. On the contrary, a rather simple assumption had been made, invoking 19th century Georg Jellinek's theory 
which claimed that individual enjoying a right may be vested with either a status positivus, a status negativus or 
a status activus. In Poland such argument was proposed by Wojciech Sokolewicz (Sokolewicz, 2005), although 
such approach in the early 21st century was already contested in German jurisprudence where Jellinek's 
influence was most visible. However, since the argument was made in prestigious commentary to Polish 
Constitution, there shall be no surprise that doctrinal band wagon effect occurred and soon the judiciary started 
to deploy same narrative to justify strict reading of right to information clause. Professor Sokolewicz went even 
further claiming that “the ramification of such characteristic ['a right to something' - M.B.] of the right to 
information results in possibility of strict interpretation of the law regarding its enforcement, an interpretation 
with less restrictions [more deference - M.B.] when it comes to limitations, unlike in case of limitations imposed 
on civic freedoms” (Sokolewicz, 2005, p. 5). 
Robert Alexy's theory of constitutional rights helps to broaden a perspective on possible relation between articles 
54 and 61 of the Polish Constitution. Alexy concluded that „positive protection of liberty against the state arises 
from the combination of liberty with a right to a positive act. The idea of positive protection is hardly 
problematic when one is concerned with things like protection from third parties by the norms of criminal law. 
Problems arise in the case of entitlements such as state subsidies. There is a certain structural correspondence 
in that both cases concern making what is legally possible for the right-holder factually possible as well. The 
structural correspondence permits us, in spite of general linguistic usage, to call the combination of a liberty 
with an entitlement in its narrow sense ensuring the factual appropriation of liberty, a protection of liberty. The 
question of whether and to what extant the Basic Law contains positive protections of this nature will for the 
moment be left entirely open” (Alexy, 2010, p. 149). Unlike the German Basic Law of 1949, The Polish 
Constitution hardly ever allows to leave an issue of protecting the freedom of information gathering as an 
„open” matter left entirely to a choice of the current political force controlling the legislature since the Art. 61 
established a very detailed framework of such protection. Unfortunately, it is still unclear how the Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal sees such connection. In the judgment of 2 February 2002 (K 38/01) Tribunal stated that 
Art. 61 defines “fundamental scope of right to information” however it refrained from further remarks on the 
other possible constitutional sources of right to information. However it was noticeable that Tribunal also 
invoked a Council of Europe's recommendations on access to official documents entrenched in freedom to 
receive and impart information without interference which inspired the Polish Art. 54. In the reasons for 
judgment of 13 December 2016 (K13/16) Tribunal stated that “freedom of information shall not be reduced to 
information or opinions received as favourable or perceived as indifferent” and its function may be described as 
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e.g., „a service committed to combating social pathologies” (OTK-A 2016, pos. 101). The case concerned the 
meaning of Art. 54 but the function attributed by the Constitutional Tribunal to freedom of expression was 
strikingly similar to a traditional set of anticorruption and transparency arguments in favour of access to 
information laws. 
3. The Scope 
Unlike the language of the right to personal data protection (Art. 51) or the freedom to express opinions, to 
acquire and to disseminate information (Art. 54), a bearer of the right to information was described as a 'citizen'. 
The members of the National Assembly Committee explained their legislative intent in 1995 while drafting the 
present Art. 61 with the charming simplicity using the concept of citizenship (a legal relation between an 
individual and a state): “A citizen who pays taxes has right to know how the public authority operates” (Bulletin 
of National Assembly's Committee, p. 58). Of course we could treat a right to information as a concept morally 
neutral and attribute it only to a set of arguments in favour of “transparency” (setting aside dispute over whom 
we shall provide it to and what utter purpose it shall serve) grounded in fiscal duty of a citizen, but in the end we 
will not explain anything. The concept of a tax (or other similar fiscal obligations) is based on relation between 
individual and the state which might be described by four attributes: nonequivalence, mandatoriness, 
coerciveness, generality and the exemption of refund (Antonów, 2016). There is an inconsistency in treating a 
right to information as an equivalent provided for taxpayer. Art. 84 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland 
makes it even more confusing because the fiscal duty has been imposed on “everyone” (see Art. 84 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Poland), while the right to information has been guaranteed to “a citizen” (see 
Art. 61 Sec. 1 of the Constitution). Legislative intent does not really provide the coherent explanation, 
especially, if we notice that legal entities are bound by constitutional fiscal duty followed by the Corporate 
Income Tax Act of 15 February 1992 (Journal of Laws 2016, item 1888). It must be also brought to our attention 
that on 2 December 2015 the Constitutional Tribunal issued a resolution (SK 36/14) on inadmissibility denying 
non-governmental, private students and alumnus association a “civic” status under Art. 61 Sec. 1 suggesting that 
the language of the constitution encompasses only a natural person who holds a citizenship (although Polish 
constitution does not require the latter to be “Polish” one, unlike e.g. the provisions on access to civil services in 
Art. 60 or voting rights in Art. 62). Such resolutions do not constitute universally binding and final judgments of 
the Constitutional Tribunal under Art. 190 Sec. 1 of the Constitution but still may affect statutory interpretation 
(which conveniently departs from language of the Constitution and entitles ‘everyone’ to the access to public 
information). 
A textual interpretation of the Polish Constitution, doctrine or judicial practice leads to an undisputed conclusion 
that every branch of the government (legislative, executive and judicial as well as organs of state control and for 
defence of rights stipulated in Chapter IX) falls entirely within the scope of “organ of public authority” (Art. 61 
Sec. 1). Nor shall we have any doubts about wide array of persons covered by the “persons discharging public 
functions” who - according to Tribunals reasoning in opinion delivered on 20 March 2006, K17/05 – “directly 
influence legal status of an individual or at least contribute into decision making process which affects other 
subjects”. It was distinctly stated that outside that scope would fall every member of personnel who merely 
“provides services or performs a technical function” for a public institution. In opinion of 20 March 2006, 
K 17/05 Tribunal also noted a scope of information on person discharging public functions available under Art. 
61 is not exactly the same as in case of Art. 54 but the language of the opinion suggested a relation between 
those two provisions in a manner typical for positive protection of liberty:  
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“Some information concerning private sphere of public figure relevant for the interest of the public may be 
disclosed, even if relation between information and the function performed does not exist, however information 
remains important for assessment of such person's behaviour, credibility or publicly presented opinion. Art. 61 
of the Constitution [concerning “person discharging public functions” - M.B.] covers only <<segment>> of the 
right to acquire information [right to acquire information is the exact wording used in Art. 54 of the Polish 
Constitution - M.B.] which remains in correlative duty of a proper public organ to disclose it. Such duty does 
not encompass every personal data of a person discharging public functions but only those which remain in 
connection with discharged function. From this point view both provisions [Art. 54 and 61 - M.B.] can be 
described as featuring a certain complementarity”. Basically, once a person becomes attributed with public 
function, he or she also becomes a servant of the institution so the scope of the information disclosed must be 
always assessed as either useful for assessment of the public institution or lacking such characteristic.  
 “A document” in Art. 61 Sec. 2 has not been specified (e.g. private, official, public, working, internal), which 
makes it a fact of empirical nature, any material data carrier containing data preserved in any shape or form 
readable by human senses or programmed machine. A meaning of a document shall not depend on a political 
decision of a legislature. In other words, any legal dispute shall not be based on the issue whether a particular 
data carrier held by government constitutes a document. The key issue shall be focused rather on to what 
statutory exemptions may apply to a requested document. No matter how logical and constitutional it may 
sound, such approach is not being taken in practice. The following example may serve as a comment: in 2013 a 
general case-law exemption of intra-agency (internal) documents falling outside the scope of the statutory 
provisions became a very controversial issue when the Constitution Tribunal invoked in its opinion of 13 
November 2013, P 25/12 - as obiter dictum - a judicial practice applying such construct. It was only one 
sentence focused on a statue rather than the Constitution, a brief remark stating that Tribunal “recognizes such 
practice” without a further consideration of the fact that neither “internal document” nor “intra agency record” 
exist in the Polish Law on Access to Public Information and there is strong historical evidence that deputies did 
not intend to adopt such exemption. The administrative judiciary quickly overstepped its powers claiming that 
Tribunal's opinion shall be considered as major victory, since a judge-made exemption had been allegedly 
approved by the constitutional courts itself. Unfortunately, still little consideration has been given to the fact that 
the Tribunal’s observation was not crucial for the facts and the law of the case and did not constitute any related 
constitutional issue.  
Apart from access to document, section 2 also refers to entry to sittings of collective organs of public authority 
formed by universal elections, with the opportunity to make sound and visual recordings. In case of bicameral 
parliament (Sejm and Senat or National Assembly acting pursuant to Art. 114 of the Constitution) such right 
shall be executed according to the procedural rules established in the internal rules of proceedings (see Art. 61 
Sec. 4) however this question is not entirely left to parliamentary autonomy. An internal regulation of a chamber 
shall be focused only on procedure and may not modify a substance of the right. This provision is also crucial in 
case of constitutive organs of self-government units which do not enjoy a similar law making privilege but fall 
entirely under the scope of the Law on Access to Public Information. 
A dedicated limitation clause in Art. 61 Sec. 3 provides a standard set of interest that may be recognized and 
protected upon a statue. A limitation clause shall be construed in conjunction witch general proportionality 
principle established under Art. 31 Sec. 3. Art. 61 Sec. 3 reduced the array of interest which may be invoked as a 
reason for specific exemption but it does not provide proportionality mechanism nor does it prohibit a breach of 
the essence of the right. Polish constitutional jurisprudence did not produce any particular case law on specific 
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legislative technique of limiting the right to information, however so far every motion meant to strike down a 
statutory limitations bearing resemblance to British “exclusions” or “absolute exemptions” (Birkinshaw, Varney 
2011) met with Tribunal's approval. In two separate opinions of The Constitutional Tribunal of 9 April 9 2015, 
K 14/13 and of 7 June 2016, K 8/15, the Constitutional Tribunal struck down statues operating with an 
exemption deprived of any balancing mechanism and following the same linguistic structure (e.g. “information 
on matters X do not constitute a public information accessible under Law on Access to Public Information”). 
Conclusions 
The introduction of a citizen’s right to information in 1997 was extremely challenging in the Republic of Poland 
which had never enjoyed any form of freedom of information law or actively state-supported civic society and 
therefore still hardly bears any tradition in holding the branches of the government accountable. In the country of 
prolonged distrust to various oppressive form of state, a constitutional right to information had been considered 
as a desired instrument to shape a new democratic society carried by the optimism of the late 20th century. 
Ironically, these sociological factors could have also affected the progressing narrow interpretation of relatively 
detailed Art. 61 of the Polish Constitution. Unlike in Spanish constitutional jurisprudence, Polish approach to 
relation between the freedom of expression clause (Art. 54) and right to information (Art. 61) still remains an 
open-ended issue but the aforementioned Tribunal’s jurisprudence eventually led to a significant downgrade of 
the latter. Today it still treats the right to information mostly as an isolated subjective right with much of its 
scope left to statutory regulation and administrative court's activist interpretation. This is hardly acceptable on 
logical grounds since the level of detail in the supreme constitutional provisions leaves little leeway for 
legislative branch. A parliamentary system in Poland does not create any incentive for objectively justified, 
broad reading of constitutional right to information leaving major political players satisfied with relatively weak 
and ineffective provisions of a statute. A time will tell, whether a Polish society will recognize the need for 
anticorruption and transparency laws eventually abandoning the progressing neutralization of goals and values 
underpinning Art. 61 of the Constitution. 
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